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LANDLORD LIABILITY IN MASSACHUSETTS
Traditional rules governing the landlord-tenant relationship made it ex-
tremely difficult for a person injured on leased premises to maintain an action
against the landlord.' Except for a limited number of situations, the landlord at
common law enjoyed an immunity from tort liability.' In recent years,
however, many jurisdictions have expressed displeasure with the concept of
landlord immunity, and have sought broader means of holding a landlord
liable.'
In the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, developments within the last
several years have completely abrogated the liability protection granted to
landlords at common law. Both the legislature and judiciary played active roles
in this dramatic change. The legislature helped to lay the groundwork by enact-
ing housing statutes that expanded the duty owed by a landlord toward his ren-
tal property. 4 Included in the statutory provisions are amendments that
prescribe specific circumstances in which a landlord can be held liable for per-
sonal injury.' The Massachusetts Supreme judicial Court initiated a trend
similar to that of the legislature, by increasing the landlord's responsibility
toward his rental property and by expanding the landlord's potential liability
in tort. 6 Furthermore, in two recent decisions, the court has allowed recovery
for personal injury on alternative theories of implied warranty and negligence.'
This note will discuss the evolution of landlord tort liability in
Massachusetts. First, common law developments will be surveyed with par-
' See text and notes at notes 10-65 infra.
2 Id.
See, e.g., Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973); Brennan v. Cockrell
Inv., Inc., 35 Cal. App. 3d 796, 111 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1973); Pagelsdorf v. Safeco Ins. Co. of
America, 91 Wis. 2d 734, 284 N.W. 2d 55 (1979); Clarke v. O'Connor, 435 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir.
1970). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY SS 7-18 (1977).
• See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 111, 55 127 A-K (1960) (sanitary code violation rem-
edies); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 186, 5 14 (1950) (penalties for failure to furnish essential services
or for breach of quiet enjoyment); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 186, 5 15E (1972) 127 (preclusion of
certain defense for housing code violation in common area); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 186, 5 19
(1972) (tort liability for lessor for failure to repair after notice); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 239, 5 8A
(summary process defenses and counterclaims; rent withholding).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 186, 5 19 provides in pertinent part:
The tenant or any person rightfully on said premises injured as a result of the
failure to correct said unsafe condition (housing code violation] within a
reasonable time shall have a right of action in tort against the landlord or lessor for
damages.
5 See text and notes at notes 81-162 infra.
' See Crowell v. McCaffrey, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 568, 386 N.E.2d 1256 (1979)
(breach of implied warranty); Young v. Garwacki, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 729, 402 N.E.2d 1045
(1980) (negligence).
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titular emphasis on growth in Massachusetts. Recent judicial and legislative
trends which precipitated the erosion of landlord immunity will then be ex-
amined. This note will next discuss the current state of landlord tort liability in
Massachusetts in light of two important decisions: Crowell v. McCaffrey 8 and
Young v. Garwacki. 9 Finally, some still unresolved issues in this area will be ex-
plored.
I. COMMON LAW DEVELOPMENT IN LANDLORD TORT LIABILITY
At common law, the landlord generally was immune from liability for per-
sonal injuries occurring to anyone on the leased property. This immunity was
fostered by the long-standing principle that a lease was a conveyance of real
estate. '° As a consequence of this view, the landlord conceptually transferred
ownership of the rental property to the tenant." Hence, the landlord's limited
liability was seen as a logical corollary to his lack of control." In short, the ren-
tal transaction closely resembled a sale of land for a period of time." The result
was the application of the doctrine of caveat emptor to the rental exchange."
The common law view of the lease as a conveyance originated in the con-
text of an agrarian, feudal society.I 5 In this setting, the tenant's primary need
was the acquisition of the land itself. 16 Any building or structure situated on the
land was generally considered a secondary and incidental aspect of the lease."
Because the rental transaction focused on the use of the land, rather than the
use of the buildings on the land, landlord maintenance was not considered in-
tegral to the agreement." Thus, due to his diminished control and the lack of
emphasis on buildings, the landlord was not expected to make repairs during
8
 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 568, 386 N.E.2d 1256 (1979).
9 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 729, 402 N.E.2d 1045 (1980).
L° As one court noted: "A lease is merely a form of transfer of a right in real estate,"
Conahan v. Fisher, 233 Mass. 234, 236, 124 N.E. 13, 14 (1919). See also Cowen v. Sunderland,
145 Mass. 363, 364, 14 N.E. 117 (1887).
" Conahan v. Fisher, 233 Mass. 234, 237, 124 N.E. 13, 14 (1919).
12 Conahan v. Fisher, 233 Mass. 234, 237, 124 N.E. 13, 14 (1919) ("The law of the
landlord and tenant is founded on the conception that the demised premises pass into the control
of the tenant. This is its basis. Such control is commonly exclusive. Lack of control by the
landlord involves relief from obligation to repair"); Barrett v. Wood Realty Inc., 334 Mass. 370,
374-75, 135 N.E.2d 660, 663 (1956).
19 Fowler v. Bott, 6 Mass. 58, 62 (1809) (lease as a sale of the demised premises for a
term).
14
 Cowen v. Sunderland, 145 Mass. 363, 364, 14 N.E. 117, 118 (1887); Bowe v. Hunk-
ing, 135 Mass. 380, 386 (1883). Caveat emptor (let the buyer beware).
15
 Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 189, 295 N.E.2d 831,
837 (1973); Paradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (1647). For discussion of the evolution of
landlord tenant doctrine see The Landlord-Tenant Relationship.. A New Urban Structure, 18
N.Y.L.F. 725 (Winter 1973).
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the term of the lease. 19 As a result, the landlord generally was not held liable for
injuries caused by unsafe conditions arising on the premises during the• ten-
ancy. 20
Another ramification of the lease as a conveyance was that the landlord
had no duty to deliver possession of the rental property at the outset of the
tenancy in any particular condition. 2 ' Like a buyer of real estate, the tenant
wishing to insure the fitness of rental premises had to inspect the property for
himself." Under the doctrine of caveat emptor, there was no implied warranty
that the premises would be safe to live in or fit for occupancy at the outset of the
tenancy." As a consequence, the landlord usually was not liable for injuries
caused by defects existing prior to or at the beginning of the lease. 24
As the structure of society changed, primarily through a shift from a rural
agrarian to an urban industrial economy, the premises on the land, rather than
the land itself, became a more important element of the rental exchange."
While the primary purpose of leasing in the feudal days was to provide land for
farming, the focus of leasing in the modern day setting is to provide a dwelling
suitable for habitation." Due to this shift in purpose, common law landlord
non-liability rules, based upon an older cultural system and a rigid adherence
to the lease as a conveyance concept, often produced inequitable results.
Because the tenant bought the leasehold at his peril he could not expect the
landlord to repair pre-existing defects, and because the tenant had dominion
during the tenancy he could not rely on the landlord to take care of
maintenance."
Recognizing the frequent harshness resulting from the inflexibility of com-
mon law doctrine, the judiciary developed a number of exceptions to the
general rules of landlord non-responsiblity and tort immunity. In Massachu-
setts the exceptions which evolved were not generally as favorable to plaintiffs
j° Fiorntino v. Mason, 233 Mass. 451, 452, 124 N.E. 283, 283 (1919); Conahan v.
Fisher, 233 Mass. 234, 237-39, 124 N.E. 13, 14-15 (1919).
2° DiMarzo v. S. & P. Realty Corp., 364 Mass. 510, 513, 306 N.E.2d 432, 434 (1974);
Fiorntino v. Mason, 233 Mass. 451, 452-53, 124 N.E. 283, 283 (1919).
21 Bolieau v. Traiser, 253 Mass. 346, 348, 148 N.E. 809, 810 (1925); Fiorntino v.
Mason, 233 Mass. 451, 452, 124 N.E. 283, 283 (1919).
22 Cowen v. Sunderland, 145 Mass. 363, 364, 14 N.E. 117, 118 (1887).
" Bowe v. Flunking, 135 Mass. 380, 386 (1883) ("Buildings are let in all sorts of condi-
tions and the law is unusually strict in exempting the landlord for injuries arising from defects
when there is no warranty or actual defect . . . the rule of caveat emptor applies.")
24 Bolieau v. Traiser, 253 Mass. 346, 348, ,148 N.E. 809, 810 (1925); Stumpf v.
Leland, 242 Mass. 168, 171, 136 N.E. 399, 400 (1922); Fiorntino v. Mason, 233 Mass. 451,
452-53, 124 N.E. 283, 283 (1919).
25 Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 196-98, 293 N.E.2d 831,
841-42 (1973). See also The Landlord-Tenant Relationship: A New Urban Structure, 18
N.Y.L.F. 725, 735 (Winter 1973).
26 Id. See also Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(discussion of justifications for implied warranty of habitability).
" Young v. Garwacki, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 729, 731, 402 N.E.2d 1045, 1047 (1980).
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as those of other jurisdictions. 29 These exceptions to landlord immunity enun-
ciated by the Massachusetts judiciary may be briefly categorized as follows: (1)
injuries caused by defects in portions of an apartment building under the land-
lord's control, (2) accidents caused by hidden defects, (3) accidents caused by
defects in a short-term lease of a furnished dwelling and (4) injuries occurring
under an express repair agreement or through negligently made repairs.
Whether a person falling under one of the above exceptions could recover
depended upon the plaintiff's status. 29 Usually the tenant, the tenant's family,
and visitors lawfully on the premises were eligible to sue for damages. 3°
The first exception to landlord immunity recognized the distinction be-
tween areas on the property remaining under the landlord's control, such as
common hallways in a tenement, and areas which were part of the premises
demised to the tenant. In Massachusetts, the landlord had a duty to exercise
reasonable care to maintain areas under his control in a condition as safe as or
as safe as appeared at the outset of the lease.'" A landlord negligent in this re-
sponsibility could be held liable for any resulting injuries." This cumbersome
rule was unique to Massachusetts. 33 Other jurisdictions did not predicate the
standard on the conditions existing at the beginning of the lease, but simply re-
quired that the landlord exercise reasonable care throughout the tenancy to
maintain areas under his contro1. 34 Predictably, the Massachusetts formulation
created many difficulties. Not only did the defective area have to be controlled
by the landlord, but the defect also had to have grown worse since the inception
of the tenancy. 35
 Moreover, if the tenant knew of the defect at the outset of the
28 See text and notes at notes 31-37 and 52-54 infra. In addition, Massachusetts was the
only state not to give general recognition to another common law exception that involved proper-
ty leased for public use. Under this rule, if the leased premises were to be used by the general
public, the landlord had a duty to inspect for defects and make necessary repairs before the lease
began. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY 5 17.2 (1977). Although never generally
adopted, Massachusetts gave this exception limited recognition in Oxford v. Leathe, 163 Mass.
254, 43 N.E. 92 (1896) (four-day lease of public building). See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS 5 63 (4th ed. 1971).
29 See Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973); W. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS 55 57-62 (4th ed. 1971).
30 Bacon v. ,Jaques, 312 Mass. 371, 373, 144 N.E.2d 648, 650 (1942).
" Lindsey v. Massios, 372 Mass. 79, 81, 360 N.E.2d 631, 633 (1977); Finn v. Peters,
340 Mass. 622, 624, 165 N.E.2d 896, 898 (1960); Sordillo v. Fradkin, 282 Mass. 255, 257, 184
N.E. 666, 667(1933).
32 See, e.g,, Crea v. Stunzenas, 344 Mass. 265, 267, 182 N.E.2d 141 (1962) (tenant in-
jured from fall on piazza under landlord's control).
33
 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY 5 17.3, Reporter's Note (1977);
W. PROSSER, TORTS 5 63 (4th ed. 1971).
34 See, e.g., Ross v. Beizer, 199 Md. 187, 85 A.2d 799 (1952); Hussey v. Long Dock
R.R. Co., 100 N.J.L. 380, 126 A. 314 (1924). W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 5 63 (4th ed. 1971).
35 Sordillo v. Fradkin, 282 Mass. 255, 257, 184 N.E. 666, 667 (1933). Often the initial
inqUiry would revolve around who had control of the dangerous area. Resolution of this conflict
would frequently involve testimony concerning landlord repair of the defective condition. In this
regard evidence of landlord repair or agreement to repair could be applied toward the issue of
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lease, no liability could affix to the landlord and the landlord had no duty to
make repairs. 36 Not unexpectedly because the landlord's duty of care was
defined by conditions existing at the start of the lease, oftentimes each new ten-
ant was subjected to a different standard of fitness for the common areas. 37 In
short, although the Massachusetts common law did recognize the need to im-
pose some duty on the landlord for common area maintenance, the narrow
construction of the Massachusetts rule created many problems and frequently
allowed the landlord to escape liability.
While the landlord's liability for injuries in common areas was carefully
circumscribed, the liability for injuries on the premises demised to the tenant
was also of limited scope under the Massachusetts exceptions. According to the
hidden defects rule, the landlord had a duty to warn the tenant of any hidden
dangers on the demised premises which the landlord knew to be existing at the
outset of the lease." Failure to issue such a warning could subject the landlord
to liability if someone was injured as a result of the defect." This rule, which
ran counter to the general principle of caveat emptor, was justified by analogy
control but not toward the issue of landlord responsiblity to repair. Contrast, for example, Con-
ahan v. Fisher, 233 Mass. 234, 124 N,E. 13 (1919), where occasional repair of a platform by the
landlord was deemed insufficient to constitute an admission of responsiblity, id. at 238, 124 N.E.
at 14, with Finn v. Peters, 340 Mass. 622, 165 N.E.2d 896 (1960), where evidence of landlord
repair was allowed in on the issue of control, id. at 625, 165 N.E.2d at 898.
Resolution of who controlled a particular area often turned on tenuous factual distinctions.
See, e.g., Ludden v. Schwartz, 291 Mass. 320, 196 N.E. 870 (1935) (piazza in hallway under ten-
ant's control); Sanford v. Belemyessi, 362 Mass. 123, 284 N.E.2d 588 (1972) (rear porch used as
entrance controlled by tenants); Minkkinen v. Nymar, 325 Mass. 92, 89 N.E.2d 209 (1949)
(steps leading exclusively to tenant's apartment under tenant's control).
36 Sordillo v. Fradkin, 282 Mass. 255, 257, 184 N.E. 666, 667 (1933). In Sordillo, the
plaintiff's three-year old son was injured when he fell through a defective railing located in a com-
mon hallway of their tenement building. Prior to the effective starting date of the lease, the
tenants had discovered the danger in the hallway and had obtained a promise from the landlord's
agent to repair .it. This promise was never carried out. The court held that because the tenants
knew of the defect at the time the lease began, the landlord had no duty to repair or improve the
conditions in the hallway. The court also held that even if the landlord had made a promise to
repair, because no repairs were actually made, the landlord's maximum liability would be for
contractual damages for the cost of the repair.
" Greaney, Developing Duties of a Landlord with regard to Tenant Safety, 63 MASS. L. REV.
61, 63 (1978). As justice Greaney observed:
Conditions were altered with the dissolution of the old tenancy and the creation of
a new one. In theory a landlord could permit benign deterioration of common
areas without risk of liability if he had a steady change of tenants. Nomadic
tenants in modern apartments were not infrequent, and duty requirements
changed with the frequency of the rental.
Id.
38 Stumpf v. Leland, 242 Mass. 168, 171, 136 N.E. 399, 400 (1922) (defective porch
railing); Cowen v. Sunderland, 145 Mass. 363, 364, 14 N.E. 117, 118 (1887) (inadequately
covered cesspool); Bowe v. Hunking, 135 Mass. 380, 383 (1883) (defective tread on stairway).
The Massachusetts hidden defects exception conformed to the approach adopted by other
Jurisdictions. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY S 17.1, Reporter's note
(1977).
39 Cowen v. Sunderland, 145 Mass. 363, 364, 14 N.E. 117, 118 (1887).
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to consumer expectations in the sale of goods. 4 ° Hence, although the tenant
normally had to take the premises as he found them, it was deemed unfair to
allow the landlord to deliver property when he knew of a hidden danger. This
rule did afford some protection to the tenant and to others using the leased
property, but its narrow application made it of limited value to the injured par-
ty. For example, proving that the landlord knew of the defect could be extreme-
ly difficult,"' since the defect had to be non-discoverable on the tenant's part. 42
If the tenant knew of the defect or could have discovered it using reasonable
care, any claim for injury would generally be extinguished. 43
A third exception to the general rule of landlord tort immunity was limited
to the rental of short-term furnished property. Under this exception, the
landlord could be held liable for injuries caused by defects on the demised
premises existing at the outset of a lease." Imposition of liability in such cases
followed as a logical extension of the rule developed in Ingalls v. Hobbs, 45
 which
held that in short-term, furnished rentals the landlord had a duty to deliver
possession in a condition suitable for immediate occupancy." The Ingalls court
considered it unfair to impose pre-lease inspection requirements on the short-
term furnished lessee whose only opportunity to inspect often came on the first
day of the tenancy.'" Thus, emphasizing the contractual rather than con-
46 Id. at 364, 14 N.E. at 118. The court stated:
The principle, that one who delivers an article which he knows to be dangerous to
another ignorant of the qualities, without notice of its nature or qualities, is liable
for any injury reasonably likely to result and which does result, has been applied to
the letting of tenements.
Id.
41
 In Stumpf v. Leland, 242 Mass. 168, 136 N.E. 399 (1922), for example, the tenant
was injured when the railing of his tenement porch gave way. Id. at 170, 136 N.E. at 400. The
court in entering a verdict for the landlord concluded that actual knowledge of the danger was
necessary to create liability. Id. at 173-74, 136 N.E. at 401-02. Evidence that the landlord's agent
had made a cursory inspection of the railing from a distance, and that from such an inspection he
concluded that the railing did not seem to be in good condition, was deemed insufficient to con-
stitute knowledge of the specific nature of the danger involved. Id. at 400, 136 N.E. at 170. See
also Cooper v. Boston Housing Authority, 342 Mass. 38, 40, 172 N.E.2d 117, 119 (1961);
Bolieau v. Traiser, 253 Mass. 346, 148 N.E. 809 (1925).
42




 Ackarey v. Carbonaro, 320 Mass. 537, 540, 70 N.E.2d 418, 420 (1946); Hacker v.
Nitschke, 310 Mass. 754, 756, 39 N.E.2d 644, 646 (1942).
" 156 Mass. 348, 351, 31 N.E. 286, 287 (1892).
46 Id.
47
 Id. at 350, 31 N.E. at 286. In distinguishing the short-term lease, the court noted:
Its fitness for immediate use of a particular kind, as indicated by its appointments,
is a far more important element entering into the contract than when there is a
mere lease of real estate. One who lets for a short term a house provided with all
furnishings and appointments for immediate residence may be supposed to con-
tract in reference to a well understood purpose of the hirer to use it as a habitation.
The doctrine caveat emptor, which is ordinarily applicable to a lessee of real estate
would often work injustice if applied to cases of this kind.
Id.
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veyance qualities of the short-term, furnished lease," the court built a warran-
ty of fitness into the agreement. 49 A dangerous defect was considered a viola-
tion of the landlord's warranty and, hence, resulting injuries were includable
in damages. 5° While this position was not adopted in other jurisdictions, it did
provide a degree of protection for a small class of lessees in Massachusetts. 5 '
Yet it did not benefit the vast majority of tenants engaged in long-term rentals
in the Commonwealth.
A fourth exception to the landlord's immunity from liability involved
repair agreements and negligently made repairs. As has been noted, 52 the com-
mon law landlord had no implied duty during the period of the lease to make
repairs on the premises demised to the tenant. In Massachusetts, repairs made
by the landlord, absent an express agreement for consideration, were generally
held to be gratuitous and could only provide a basis for liability if made in a
grossly negligent fashion." This rule was unique to that state since other
jurisdictions allowed recovery for negligently made gratuitous repair. 54 Massa-
chusetts did, however, recognize two types of express repair agreements, both
of which could serve as a basis for landlord liability. 55 Under the first type of
agreement, the landlord consented to make repairs upon notice by the tenant
that a defect existed. 56 If someone was injured as a result of a repair negligently
made after the tenant had given notice, the landlord could be held liable for the
cost of the injuries. 57 If the notified landlord completely failed to attempt a re-
" Id.
49 Id. at 351, 31 N.E. at 286, 287.
'° Ackarey v. Carbonaro, 320 Mass. 537, 540, 70 N.E.2d 418, 420 (1946); Hacker v.
Nitschke, 310 Mass. 754, 756, 39 N.E.2d 644, 646 (1942). Id. In Ackarey, the minor plaintiff was
injured in a fall caused by a defective piazza railing in the furnished summer home rented by his
father. 320 Mass. at 537, 538, 70 N.E.2d at 418, 419. The court dismissed the plaintiff's claim
under the hidden defect exception, holding that there was insufficient evidence to show that the
landlord knew of the danger. Id. at 539, 70 N.E.2d at 420. Nevertheless, the court applied the In-
gall's implied warranty theory and allowed recovery for the cost of medical expenses. Id. at 540,
70 N.E.2d at 420.
" See Note, 23 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 357 (1949).
52 See text and notes at notes 15-20 and 27 supra.
53 DiMarzo v. S. & P. Realty Corp., 364 Mass. 510, 513, 306 N.E.2d 432, 434(1974);
Barrett v. Wood Realty Inc., 334 Mass. 370, 375, 135 N.E.2d 660, 664 (1956); Bergeron v.
Forest, 233 Mass. 392, 398, 124 N.E. 74, 84 (1919). An exception to the gross negligence rule
was made in cases where a negligently made gratuitous repair caused death. In such cases
negligence was sufficient under the death statute to incur liability. See, e.g., id. at 398-99, 124
N.E. 74, 84 (1919).
54 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY. 5 17.7, Reporter's Note 5 17.7 n.8 at
2:44 (1977).
" Crowe v. Bixby, 237 Mass. 249, 252, 129 N.E. 433, 435 (1921); Fiorntino v. Mason,
233 Mass. 451, 453, 124 N.E. 283, 283-84 (1919).
56 Crowe v. Bixby, 237 Mass. 249, 252, 129 N.E. 433, 435 (1921); Fiorntino v. Mason,
233 Mass. 451, 453, 124 N.E. 283, 283 (1919).
" Crowe v. Bixby, 237 Mass. 249, 252, 129 N.E. 433, 435 (1921); Fiorntino v. Mason,
233 Mass. 451, 453, 124 N.E. 283, 283 (1919). The standard for establishing sufficient con-
sideration varied. In Bergeron v. Forest, 233 Mass. 392, 124 N.E. 74 (1919), evidence that the
landlord's son made occasional repairs in order to induce the tenants to stay was ruled sufficient
892	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 22:885
pair and injury resulted, however, the landlord could be held accountable only
for the cost of the repair." Thus, attempted repair brought an increased risk of
liability whereas complete avoidance of a repair responsiblity produced no
added cost potential. Not unexpectedly, this rule actually discouraged landlord
maintenance. In the second type of repair agreement the landlord consented to
maintain the demised premises in a condition of safety without regard to notice. 59
Under this agreement, the landlord had the right to enter the premises as was
necessary to make repairs." If someone was injured because of a dangerous
defect, the landlord could be held liable for the cost of the injuries regardless of
whether he actually undertook to make repairs. 6 ' Because this arrangement
was considered contrary to normal policy, which imposed a minimal degree of
responsibility on the landlord for the leased property, maintenance agreements
of this sort were considered extremely burdensome on the landlord." For this
reason most repair agreements were not interpreted in this manner. 63
In summary, the Massachusetts common law was unusually strict in
shielding the landlord from tort liability. With the exception of limited rules in-
consideration to be non-gratuitous. Id. at 399-400, 124 N.E. at 85. As a rule, however, occa-
sional repairs created no duty and were generally held to be gratuitous. See, e.g., Galvin v. Beals,
187 Mass. 250, 252-53, 72 N.E. 969, 970 (1905), where the tenant was injured in fall from defec-
tive piazza railing. Evidence that the landlord had agreed to make repairs and had, prior to the
accident, worked on other parts of the piazza but not the railing was held insufficient to constitute
a basis for a cause of action in negligence. Id.
58 DiMarzo v. S. & P. Realty Corp., 364 Mass. 510, 513, 306 N.E.2d 432, 434 (1974);
Fiorntino v. Mason, 233 Mass. 451, 453, 124 N.E. 283, 283 (1919). In instances where damages
were held to be contractual, only the tenant or parties directly involved in the lease could recover.
Id. This rule was based on the common law distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance. As
stated in Tuttle v. Gilbert Manufacturing Co., 145 Mass. 169, 175, 13 N.E. 465, 467 (1887),
"As a general rule, there must be some active negligence or misfeasance to support tort. There
must be some breach of duty distinct from breach of contract."
59 Collins v. Humphrey, 314 Mass. 759, 760, 51 N.E.2d 327, 327 (1943); Crowe v.
Bixby, 237 Mass. 249, 252, 129 N.E. 433, 435 (1921); Fiorntino v. Mason, 233 Mass. 451, 453,
124 N.E. 283, 283-84 (1919).
6° Fiorntino v. Mason, 233 Mass. 451, 453, 124 N.E. 283, 283-84 (1919).
61 Id. at 454, 124 N.E. at 284. In Crowe v. Bixby, 237 Mass. 249, 129 N.E. 433 (1921),
one individual was killed and another injured in a fall caused by a defective piazza railing. The
court held that evidence that the landlord had agreed to "keep the place in repair and safe to live
in" was sufficient to create an agreement to repair without notice. Id. at 434-360. In Collins v.
Humphrey, 314 Mass. 759, 51 N.E.2d 327 (1943), however, the plaintiff was injured when she
tripped down .defective stairs on the demised premises. Evidence that the landlord agreed to
"take full responsibility and would make the place safe and sound" and would keep the premises
in good condition was held insufficient to create a duty for the landlord to repair without notice.
Id. at 760-62, 51 N.E.2d at 327, 328. See also Fiorntino v. Mason, 233 Mass. 451, 124 N.E..283
(1919) (injury caused by defective stairs-evidence insufficient to establish agreement to repair
without notice).
62 Fiorntino v. Mason, 233 Mass. 451, 453.54, 124 N.E. 283, 284 (1919).
65 Id. at 454, 124 N.E. at 284. In Collins v. Humphrey, 314 Mass. 759, 51 N.E.2d 327
(1943), with reference to an agreement to repair without notice, the court noted: "Such an
undertaking is burdensome in the extreme to•the landlord. . . . It must be seldom indeed that
such an agreement is actually made. Such an agreement is not readily to be inferred from





volving common areas, hidden defects, short-term furnished dwellings, and
negligently made repairs and express agreements, the person injured on the
leased premises could receive no compensation from the landlord. In practice
these rules were complex and confusing and often difficult to administer in a
fair and consistent manner." The common law exception approach which
made sense when land was the major element of the exchange, was logically in-
consistent with modern housing realities which focused on buildings on the
land with substantial segments of the population living in large urban tenement
houses." Nevertheless, the conveyance and caveat emptor doctrines retained a
strong hold on Massachusetts landlord-tenant law, and at common law the
landlord enjoyed a limited immunity from tort liability.
II. RECENT REFORMS IN MASSACHUSETTS LANDLORD-TENANT LAW
A great deal has occurred in Massachusetts law in recent years to erode
the theoretical foundation on which the landlord's limited immunity from tort
liability has stood. An important initial factor which laid the groundwork for
this development was the judicial and legislative recognition of the changing
quality of the residential lease. 66 The legislature evinced its displeasure with the
traditional concept of a lease as a conveyance by adopting extensive housing
legislation that greatly increased the landlord's maintenance responsiblities. 67
Later, specific provisions creating tort liability were added to these statutes."
The judiciary was also extremely active, creating an implied warranty of
habitability in the residential lease, abolishing "status" oriented rules which
determined the plaintiff's ability to sue the land occupier, and altering certain
common law tort rules in order to directly increase landlord tort liability."
These developments established the basis for two very recent decisions—
Crowell v. McCaffrey" and Young v. Garwacki7 t—in which the Massachusetts
Supreme judicial Court allowed recovery for injuries from landlords on alter-
native theories of breach of implied warranty and negligence." This section of
64 In discussing the Massachusetts common law exceptions Justice Greaney observed:
The cases following these concepts arrived at conclusions which turned to a large
extent on particular factual circumstances and gossamer distinctions. The result
was the creation of a number of 'pigeonholes' where recovery hinged on plugging
facts into one of the recognized sets of rules that formed the substance of the
pigeonhole.
Greaney, Developing Duties of a Landlord with Regard to Thnant Safety, 63 MASS. LAW REV. 61, 63
(1978).
65 See text and notes at notes 25-27 supra.
66 See text and notes at notes 73-162 infra.
67 See text and notes at notes 73-75 infra.
65 See text and notes at notes 76-80 infra.
69 See text and notes at notes 81-119 infra.
'° 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 568, 569, 386 N.E.2d 1256, 1258 (1979).
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 729, 736, 402 N.E.2d 1045, 1049 (1980).
72 See text and notes at notes 121-162 infra.
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the article will discuss the recent reforms in Massachusetts landlord tenant law
with special emphasis on the contribution of the Crowell and Young decisions.
A. Legislative Reform
The Massachusetts legislature paved the way for a modification of com-
mon law theory by enacting a number of housing statutes and safety codes that
set minimum standards for safety and fitness in residential tenancies." Unfor-
tunately, these statutes had little initial effect on landlord tort liability because
courts consistently held that violations of a safety code provision were not
evidence of negligence in a tort action." Nevertheless, by recognizing the need
to increase the landlord's responsibility for his housing property, the legislature
in a sense repudiated the conveyance notion of the lease and acknowledged that
the modern residential tenancy was more analogous to a contract for shelter
and services." In 1972, the legislature enacted two statutes that directly in-
creased the landlord's potential liability in tort. Under chapter 186 of the
Massachusetts General Laws, section 15E, if an injury is caused by a defect ex-
isting in a common area of a building which amounts to a housing code viola-
tion, the landlord cannot raise the defense that the defect existed at the outset of
the lease." Under chapter 186 of the Massachusetts General Laws, section 19,
a landlord is required to remedy unsafe conditions on the leased premises after
receiving proper notice." A landlord failing to exercise reasonable care to
" See note 4 supra.
" See, e.g., Stapleton v. Cohen, 353 Mass. 53, 56, 228 N. E.2d 64, 66 (1967); Greenway
Wood Heel Co., Inc. v. John Shea Co., 313 Mass. 177, 181, 46 N.E.2d 746, 750 (1943).
75 Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 198-99, 293 N.E.2d 831,
842-43 (1973).
76 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 186, 15E provides:
An owner of a building shall be precluded from raising as a defense in an action
brought by a lessee, tenant or occupant of said building who has sustained injury
caused by a defect in a common area that said defect existed at the time of letting of
the property, if said defect is at the time of injury a violation of the building code of
the city or town wherein the property is situated. Any waiver of this provision in
any lease or other rental agreement shall be void and unenforceable.
" MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 186, 5 19 provides:
A landlord or lessor of any real estate except an owner-occupied two- or three-
family dwelling shall, within a reasonable time following receipt of a written notice
from a tenant forwarded by registered or certified mail of an unsafe condition, not
caused by the tenant, his invitee, or any one occupying through or under the ten-
ant, exercise reasonable care to correct the unsafe condition described in said
notice except that such notice need not be given for unsafe conditions in that por-
tion of the premise not under control of the tenant. The tenant or any person
rightfully on said premises injured as a result of the failure to correct said unsafe
condition within a reasonable time shall have right of action in tort against the
landlord or lessor for damages. Any waiver of this provision in any lease or other
rental agreement shall be void and unenforceable. The notice requirement of this
section shall be satisfied by a notice from a board of health or other code enforce-
ment agency to a landlord or lessor of residential premises not exempted by the
provisions of this section of a violation of the state sanitary code or other applicable
by-laws, ordinances, rules or regulations.
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make repairs in a reasonable time after notice may be held liable for resulting
injuries. 78 Although these statutes allow a greater tort recovery potential, they
are still difficult to use in several respects. Section 15E, for example, requires
that the defect be a violation of the appropriate housing code." This may
preclude recovery for injuries caused by non-housing code defects. In addition,
section 19 cannot be used unless the landlord receives proper notice as set out
in the statute." A plaintiff injured where proper notice was not given could
conceivably lose his section 19 cause of action.
B. Judicial Reform
1. Decisions Prior to Crowell and Young
Extensive judicial reformulation of landlord-tenant and corresponding
tort law began in 1972. The major break came in Boston Housing Authority v.
Hemingway." This case marked the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's
first indication of its willingness to abandon traditional conveyance notions of
the lease in favor of a modern contractual approach premised on changing
social conditions and legislative intent, as interpreted through the housing
statutes. 82 In Hemingway the landlord brought an action of summary process
against his tenants for failure to pay rent." As part of their defense, the tenants
argued that by allowing the premises to deteriorate, the landlord had breached
an implied warranty of habitability, therefore extinguishing their rent obliga-
tion." Agreeing with the tenants, the court held that there was an implied war-
ranty of habitability in the residential lease which served as a proper defense to
the summary process action."
In arriving at this new implied warranty of habitability standard, the Hem-
ingway court noted the changing quality of the residential lease, stressing the
evolution from the common law emphasis on the land to the modern-day focus
7B Id.
" See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 186, § 15E; sanitary code standards of fitness for human
habitation, Mass. Sanitary Code, Ch. II, 105 Code of Mass. Regs..(C.M,R.) 400.000 - 410.960
(1979).
5° Under MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 186, S 19 written notice must be given in reasonable
time by registered or certified mail. This requirement is satisfied by notice from a board of health
or other code enforcement agency. In areas of the premises not under control of the tenant, notice
is unnecessary as the landlord has a duty to inspect and maintain common areas.
81 363 Mass. 184, 293 N. E.2d 831 (1973).
a' Id. at 195-99, 293 N.E.2d at 840-43.
83 Id. at 185, 293 'N.E.2d at 835.
a* M The tenants also argued that they were permitted to withhold rent pursuant to
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 239, 5 8A, which allows a tenant to withhold rent after giving the landlord
adequate notice that the premises are below the minimum standards set by the housing codes:
The court rejected this argument, finding that the tenants had not complied with the notice re-
quirements in 8A. Id. at 203, 293 N.E.2d at 845.
83 Id. at 199, 203, 293 N.E.2d at 843, 845. The court held that under the implied war-
ranty the tenants were eligible for at least a partial rent withholding. Id.
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on urban residential apartment buildings. 86 In short, the court found that the
exception announced in Ingalls v. Hobbs," which applied an implied warranty
of habitability to short-term furnished dwellings, was now the overriding rule
in all residential leases." The Hemingway court emphasized in its reasoning that
the legislature also, through the housing codes, had evidenced a recognition
that the modern day lease was not reconcilable with old common law. 89
Hemingway did not deal specifically with the issue of the landlord tort liabili-
ty. Yet, by redefining the residential lease as essentially a contract for services
and reaffirming the landlord's duty to maintain housing property at a defined
minimum standard, the court established the theoretical basis on which prin-
ciples relating to personal injury could be developed. In this respect Hemingway
presaged the beginning of a rapid and dramatic change in the common law
governing the landlord tenant laws in Massachusetts.
Hemingway was soon followed by Mounsey v. Ellard, where the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts disregarded the common law concept that the
duty owed a visitor by the occupier of land varied according to the status
classification of the visitor." This case solidified the court's desire to do away
with outmoded common law property rules that failed to respond to modern
day needs. In Mounsey a police officer, en route to delivering a summons to a
home owner, slipped and was injured on an icy walk." Under a common law
analysis, a police officer was generally categorized as licensee and could
recover in negligence only upon a showing of "willful, wanton or reckless con-
duct" on the part of the land occupier." Conversely, plaintiffs classified as
"invitees" could recover upon a demonstration of ordinary negligence. 93 In a
major reversal of common law doctrine, the court abolished this status classifi-
cation test and held that the occupier of land owed to all lawful visitors the
same duty — to exercise reasonable care to maintain the premises in a safe con-
dition." In presenting its rationale, the court pointed out that the licensee-
86 Id. at 196-97, 293 N.E.2d 841.
a' 156 Mass. 348, 351, 31 N.E. 286, 287 (1892).
88 Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 196-97, 293 N.E.2d 831,
841 (1973). Said the court:
Our reexamination leads us to conclude that the exception . . . carved out by the
Ingalls case, in response to what was then an unusual situation, must now become
the rule in an urban industrial society where the essential objective of the leasing
transaction is to provide a dwelling suitable for habitation. . . .
Id.
89 Id. at 194-95, 196, 293 N.E.2d at 840, 841.
98 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973).
91 Id. at 694, 297 N.E.2d at 44.
92 Id.
98 Id. at 695, 297 N.E.2d at 45.
94 Id. at 707, 297 N.E.2d at 51. While abolishing the licensee-invitee distinction, the
court refused to change the legal status of trespassers, who are owed only the duty to avoid willful
and similar misconduct. Id. at 707 n.7,.297 N.E.2d at 51 n.7. But see, Soule v. Massachusetts
Electric Co., 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1380, 390 N.E.2d 716 (1979) (duty of reasonable care owed to






invitee distinction found little logical support in a modern cultural setting. 95
Not only was the status test difficult to administer and inconsistent in its
results, but it ran counter to the current trend of holding all defendants in such
tort cases to a reasonable standard of care."
Again, although Mounsey did not deal specifically with the issue of landlord
tort liability, it indicated the court's recognition that common law rules of
property needed to be simplified in order to conform to modern day theory,
which attempted to do away with pre-deterministic tests designed to measure
the defendant's liability. The court's emphasis now would center on a different
approach, necessitating a standard of "reasonable care in all circumstances" 97
taking into account the many factors surrounding the incident.
Drawing on the themes developed in Hemingway and Mounsey, the
Supreme Judicial Court in Lindsey v. Massios98 applied modernized lease and
tort ideas directly to the problems of landlord tort liability." In Lindsey, a guest
of the tenant was injured when she fell down a slippery and dimly lit common
stairway of a tenement owned by the defendant landlord.'°° The Supreme
Judicial Court overruled the former Massachusetts common law test which tied
the landlord's duty of care in maintaining areas under his contract to the condi-
tion in which the premises were or appeared to be in at the outset of the
lease.'°' In bringing Massachusetts up to date with other jurisdictions, the
court held that the landlord could be liable to a tenant's guests for injuries
caused by the negligent failure to maintain common areas in a tenement in safe
repair.'" This duty extended throughout the term of the lease and was no
longer predicated on conditions existing at the beginning of the tenancy. 1 ° 3 In
reaching its decision, the court relied on its reasoning in Mounsey which favored
(1974) (reasonable duty of care and affirmative action if necessary owed to helplessly trapped
trespassers).
95 Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 706-07, 297 N.E.2d 43, 51 (1973).
99 Id. at 705, 706, 297 N.E.2d at 50, 51. The Mounsey court indicated its willingness to
part with prior precedent which ran counter to modern policy:
We can no longer follow this ancient and largely discredited common law distinc-
tion which favors the free use of property without due regard to the personal safety
of those individuals who have heretofore been classified as licensees. The problem
of allocating the costs and risks of human injury is far too complex to be decided
solely by the status of the entrant, especially where the status question often
prevents the jury from ever determining the fundamental question whether the
defendant has acted reasonably in light of all the circumstances in the particular
case.
U. at 706.07, 297 N.E.2d at 51,
" Id, at 708, 297 N.E.2d at 52.
98 372 Mass. 79, 360 N.E.2d 631 (1977).
59 Id.
'°° Id. at 80, 81, 360 N.E.2d at 633.
101 Id. at 82, 360 N.E.2d at 634.
102 Id. Note that this case arose prior to the effective date of MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 186,
5 15E which would provide a similar result.
'"' Id.
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the "protection of personal safety over rights of absolute property control.' "° 4
As in Mounsey, rules which found their underlying rationale no longer
grounded in modern day reality needed to be altered.'"
In Lindsey, the court also overruled the firmly entrenched common law
rule which held that violation of a safety statute could not be used as evidence
of negligence, at least with regard to common areas.'° 6 In allowing violation of
a code provision to be used as evidence of negligence, the court reasoned that
the former rule was based on the assumption that the landlord's only duty of
care toward areas under his control was to maintain them in the same condi-
tion as they were at the outset of the lease.'" By changing the landlord's duty
toward common areas to one of reasonable care throughout the lease, the court
undercut the former rule's rationale.'"
Although the Lindsey opinion was limited to areas in the tenement under
the landlord's control, the case did directly increase the landlord's responsibili-
ty and potential in negligence by first judicially requiring continual upkeep of
common areas throughout the lease and second by recognizing the use of safety
statutes as evidence of negligence.'" Soon after Lindsey the court in King v. G &
M Realty Corp.'" extended the rule created in Lindsey, which applied only to
tenants' guests, to tenants as well."'
In Poirier v. Town of Plymouth" the Supreme Judicial Court signalled its
dissatisfaction with yet at - ither common law tort rule which held that the only
duty owed an employee by his employer was to disclose the existence of hidden
defects on the premises.'" In Poirier, an employee of an independent contractor
working for the Town of Plymouth was injured when a ladder he was climbing
broke and threw him to the ground." 4 Under existing law, in order to prevail
in his action against the Town, the employee had to show the accident was
caused by a hidden defect which the defendant knew or should have known ex-
isted." The court abolished the hidden defects rule and held that the employer
1°4 Id. at 82, 360 N.E.2d at 634.
1(15 Id.
106 Id. at 83, 360 N.E.2d at 634. The plaintiff claimed that the condition of the hallway
violated MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 144, 5 61, which requires the lighting of common hallways near
stairways at night in tenement houses.
" 7 372 Mass. 79, 83, 360 N.E.2d 631, 634 (1977).
Lou Id. The Lindsey court, however, refused to rule that violation of MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 144, 5 61 created a cause of action for nuisance under MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 144, 5 88. Id. at
84-85, 360 N.E.2d at 635.
109 Requiring the continual upkeep of common areas by landlord is consistent with
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 186, 5 15E. See note 76 supra.
10 373 Mass. 658, 370 N.E.2d 413 (1977).
lit Id. The court held the tenant was owed the same standard of care as tenants' guests.
Id. at 661, 370 N.E.2d at 415, "the tenant is not different from the visitor except as he may the
more readily have or be chargeable with knowledge of a dangerous condition of a common
area.
1 " 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 100, 372 N.E.2d 212 (1978).
113 Id.
114 Id. at 100, 372 N.E.2d at 216-17.
"3 Id. at 105, 372 N.E.2d at 218-19.
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owed employees of independent contractors a duty to exercise reasonable care
to keep the premises safe." 6 This conclusion was consistent with Mounsey and
Lindsey, decisions which sought to do away with common law tests for assessing
liability in tort."' The court again stressed that such formulas found little
logical support in our modern society. "8 The court also noted the particular in-
congruence in placing on the plaintiff the burden of proving a defect which was
both too difficult to be discovered by the employee through a "reasonable in-
spection" but not so obscure as to be non-discoverable by the employee using
"reasonable care. ""9 Preceding both Crowd! and Young, this case forecast the
demise of the hidden defects rule as it applied to the landlord-tenant situation.
In summary, both the Massachusetts legislature and judiciary were ex-
tremely active in laying firm groundwork for the abolition of landlord tort im-
munity. The legislature aided this process by instituting an extensive set of
statutes and codes greatly increasing landlord responsibility and in section 15E
and section 19, expanding landlord liability. The judiciary first did away with
the old conveyance notion of the lease in Hemingway by adopting an implied
warranty of habitability approach. In additiOn, various other common law
property rules were abolished in cases such as Mounsey and Poirier. Finally,
landlord liability was directly increased in Lindsey and King, at least with
respect to common areas in a tenement.
2. Crowell and Young
With great rapidity, the Supreme judicial Court decided two cases which
capitalized on recent judicial and legislative reforms and completely wiped out
any vestige of landlord immunity. These decisions foreclose the further need
for common law exception analysis. Added to section 19, these two new
theories may be used to hold a landlord liable for injuries occurring on the
leased premises.
In Crowell v. McCaffrey, 12° the court extended the implied warranty of
habitability theory developed in Hemingway to include personal injuries occur-
ring on the premises rented to the tenant.' 21 In Crowell, a tenant sued his
landlord for injuries sustained after he fell from a third-story porch when the
" 6 Id. at 116, 127, 372 N.E.2d at 223, 227.
317 Id, at 119-21, 127, 372 N.E.2d at 224-25, 227-28.
" 8 Id. at 118, 372 N.E.2d at 224. The court stated:
Were there strong social policy reasons to maintain the hidden defect test, the
hurdles thrown in the path of the injured employee of an independent contractor
might be unobjectionable. Recent decisions of this court clearly reflect, however, a
shift in philosophy with regard to status distinctions in tort standards of care,
casting great doubt on the continuing relevancy of this aspect of the common law
hidden defect test. . . .
Id.
" 9 Id. at 118, 372 N.E.2d at 224.
120 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 568, 386 N.E.2d 1256 (1979).
121 Id. at 569, 386 N.E.2d at 1258.
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railing he was leaning on gave way.' 22
 The tenant rented the third-story apart-
ment, but there was conflicting evidence as to who controlled the porch.'"
Photographs were produced which showed the porch railing to be in a
deteriorated state. 124
 The trial judge concluded that the porch was rented to the
tenant and under his control.'" As a result, the rule in Lindsey and King, re-
quiring that the landlord exercise reasonable care to maintain common areas,
was not applied,'" and evidence that the porch violated housing code provi-
sions was similarly excluded.'" In addition, assuming that the porch was
under the tenant's control, the trial judge found no evidence that the landlord
knew or had received adequate notice, as was required to take advantage of
recovery under the housing code provisions.'"
The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that a jury could have
found the porch to be under the landlord's control.'" Hence, under Lindsey
and King, violation of a housing code statute could have been admissible as
evidence of negligence. 13° More importantly, the court ruled that even if the
porch had remained in the tenant's control, the tenant could rely on an implied
warranty of habitability to obtain recovery from the landlord for his injuries. 131
This new cause of action sprang in part from an extension of Hemingway to in-
clude tort liability. 132 It also followed from Mounsey, Poirier, and other cases
which broadened the land occupier's tort liability, and from Lindsey and King,
which directly increased the landlord's liability for personal injury.'"
The Crowell court utilized the housing code statutes to help define the
scope of the landlord's liability under the implied warranty theory, making it
clear that the landlord who failed to comply with the minimum requirements
established by the codes could be subject to liability for injuries." 4 Despite its
' 22 Id.
123 Id. at 576, 386 N.E.2d at 1260.
12' Id. at 569, 386 N.E.2d at 1258.
'" Id.
126 Id. at 575, 386 N.E.2d at 1260.
t" Id. at 575-76, 386 N.E.2d at 1260. See text and notes at notes 108-11 supra.
128 Id. at 569-70, 386 N.E.2d at 1258.
' 29 Id. at 575.76, 386 N.E.2d at 1260.
13° Id.
' 3 ' Id. at 577-79, 386 N.E.2d at 1261-62.
"2 Id. at 578, 386 N.E.2d at 1261. The court reasoned: "Thus extension of the warran-
ty to the ordinary residential tenancy at will, in accordance with the Hemingway decision, logically
carries with it liability for personal injuries caused by a breach." Id.
' 3 ' Id. at 572-73, 386 N.E.2d at 1259-60. The other cases mentioned extending land-
owner liability were Pridgen v. Boston Housing Auth., 364 Mass. 696, 711-13, 308 N.E.2d 467,
477-78 (1974) (liability to trespasser); Bouchard v. De Gagne, 368 Mass. 45, 329 N.E.2d 114
(1975) (retroactive application of Mounsey rule); Poirier v. Town of Plymouth, 1978 Mass. Adv.
Sh. 100, 372 N.E.2d 212 (1978) (liability of landowner for hidden defects to employee of in-
dependent contractor).
' 34 Crowell v. McCaffrey, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 568, 579, 306 N.E.2d 1256, 1260-61
(1979). The Crowell court noted that Hemingway dealt only with "vital" facilities on the residential
premises. Id. at 578, 386 N.E.2d at 1261-62. The court also pointed out that the concurring and
dissenting opinions in Hemingway were not limited to vital facilities. Id. The Crowell court held
that it was unnecessary to decide whether the porch was a vital facility or alternatively to adopt a
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reliance on the codes, however, the court left open the possibility that the im-
plied warranty action might not be limited to the statute's violation and notice
requirements.'" Thus, just as the Ingall's rule, which allowed recovery of rent
under an implied warranty theory in short-term dwellings, was expanded to in-
clude liability in tort,' 36 and later extended to all residential leases in Hem-
ingway, so too was the Hemingway decision, which allowed among other things
the withholding of rent, extended to include liability for personal injury.'"
Soon after Crowell, the court displayed its willingness to add yet another
theory to hold the landlord liable. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
extended recent reforms in Young v, Garwacki,'" by adopting a negligence test
to deal with the issue of landlord liability in cases where a tenant's guest is in-
jured on the rental premises.' 39 In Young a guest of the tenant was injured when
she fell from a second story porch after a defective railing gave way.'" The
porch could only be reached through the tenant's apartment and was part of
the demised premises under the tenant's control."' Some months prior to the
accident the landlord warned the tenant that the railing was unsafe, after the
landlord's insurance company had determined that the railing was dangerous
and cancelled his liability insurance. 142 Although the landlord was under no ex-
press agreement to keep the rental premises in repair, he felt it his obligation to
fix the railing."' Thus the landlord purchased materials to repair the railing,
but no repairs were made.'"
In an action for damages in negligence brought in Superior Court against
the landlord and the tenant, a jury returned a verdict against both de-
fendants. 145 After the verdict was returned, the landlord was granted a motion
wider scope of implied warranty, because it concluded that a jury could have found that the porch
violated building and sanitary codes. Id. at 578-79, 386 N.E.2d at 1261. In this case then, Crowell
limited its holdings to injuries caused by housing code violations.
' 55 Id. at 579-80, 386 N.E.2d at 1262. It was unnecessary for the court to determine
whether the landlord had received proper notice as was required by the codes. The court conclud-
ed that there was evidence to show that the code violations existed at the time of letting. Id. at
579, 386 N.E.2d at 1262. Because the accident occurred two months after the tenancy began, it
was also unnecessary for the court to decide whether the landlord had adequate opportunity to
repair after notice as the code required. Id. Hence, the issue of compliance with code re-
quirements for violations occurring after the beginning of the lease was avoided.
' 56 The short-term dwelling exception was later extended to include liability in tort. See
Ackarey v. Carbonaro, 320 Mass. 537, 70 N.E.2d 418 (1946); Hacker v. Nitschke, 310 Mass.
754, 39 N.E.2d 644 (1942). See text and notes at notes 49-54 supra.
' 37 Crowell v. McCaffrey, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 568, 386 N.E.2d 1256 (1979).
' 35 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 729, 402 N.E.2d 1045 (1980).
' 54 Id. at 736, 402 N.E.2d at 1049.
140 Id. at 730, 402 N.E.2d at 1046.




11 ' Id. No appeal was taken from the verdict by the tenant-defendant Garwacki. Under
traditional tort analysis, the tenant who remains in control of an unsafe area on the rented
premises could always be held liable for injuries. Id. at 735 n.5, 402 N.E.2d at 1049 n.5.
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notwithstanding the verdict.'" The plaintiff appealed. On appeal the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in an unanimous decision, reversed and held
that: even in the absence of express agreement by the landlord to keep the ren-
tal premises in repair, a landlord may be held liable to his tenant's guests for
injuries which result from the landlord's negligent failure to maintain the safety
of the premises. 14 7
As its rationale, the court explained that both judicial and legislative
trends supported the imposition of a negligence standard.'" The court noted
that in Hemingway, Lindsey, King, and Crowell, it had attempted to increase
landlord responsibility and liability, while in related cases, such as Mounsey, it
sought to disregard old common law status tests. 14 9 Further, the court observed
that the legislature, buttressing judicial reform, had established a housing
code, which set minimum standards of habitability, and enacted section 15E
and section 19, which directly increased landlord liability. 150
The Young court also pointed out two policy reasons which under previous
law made it difficult- to bring suit against a landlord and sometimes discouraged
repairs. According to the court, the first reason was the difficulty that plaintiffs
injured on the demised premises experienced in even raising the issue of
landlord negligence at trial. 15 ' Notwithstanding a limited number of excep-
tions, if the accident occurred on a tenant-controlled portion of the property,
the landlord, devoid of maintenance responsibility, was immune from
liability.'" The court emphasized the tremendous effort made by judges to
stretch fact patterns to fit exceptions in order to allow recovery.'" By implica-
tion the use of a general negligence standard which eliminates the further need
of exceptions, would make it easier to bring an action and simpler to handle the
issues in a case in a clear and consistent manner.' 54 A second factor encourag-
ing a new rule for landlord care was that many times neither the landlord, who
stood to increase his liability potential, nor the tenant, who lacked means and
expertise to make long-term repairs, had strong incentive to engage in
maintenance.'" As a result dangerous defects would often go unremedied until
someone was actually hurt.'"
Finally, the Young court found support for its decision from other jurisdic-
tions which to varying degrees had abolished the rule of landlord immunity.'"
146 Id.
147 Id. at 735, 402 N.E.2d at 1049. The court expressed the new rule: "Today we do
away with the ancient law which bars a tenant's guest from receiving compensation from a
landlord for injuries caused by negligent maintenance of areas rented to the tenant."
148 Id. at 733-34, 402 N.E.2d at 1048-49.
149 Id. at 733-35, 402 N.E.2d at 1048-49.
15° Id, at 733 n.3, 737-38, 402 N.E.2d at 1048 n.3, 1050-51.
1 " Id. at 735, 402 N.E.2d at 1049.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 736 n.6, 402 N.E.2d at 1049 n.6.
' 5* Id.
135 Id. at 735, 402 N.E.2d at 1049.
"6 Id. at 735-36, 402 N.E.2d at 1049.
'" Id. at 736, 402 N.E.2d at 1049.
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The court found the reasoning in the New Hampshire decision, Sargent v.
Ross,'" particularly convincing and utilized the language in this case to express
the Massachusetts rule:
Henceforth, landlords as other persons must exercise reason-
able care not to subject others to an unreasonable risk of harm. A
landlord must act as a reasonable person under all circumstances in-
cluding the likelihood of injury to others, the probable seriousness of
such injuries and the burden of reducing or avoiding the risk. 159
In stating this test, the court in Young was careful to point out that the
common law approach did have an element of validity. Because the landlord
lacked control of the demised premises during the lease, it was often difficult for
him to inspect or repair.'" The court, however, rejected the notion that this
lack of control would be outcome determinative by itself.' 61 Rather, the issue of
control would become another element in the overall negligence test, bearing
on "reasonableness and foreseeability. "162
Hence, in less than ten years, Massachusetts law evolved from a common
law exception analysis, to a general rule which held the landlord liable for
failure to fulfill his maintenance responsibility toward both areas under his con-
trol and areas demised to the tenant. The culmination of this trend came in
Crowell and Young, which provide actions against the landlord on theories of
breach of implied warranty and negligence.
III. ANALYSIS OF RECENT REFORMS IN MASSACHUSETTS
LANDLORD-TENANT LAW
A. Judicial and Legislative Reforms
With the imposition of the negligence formula announced in Young and the
implied warranty action created in Crowd!, the Massachusetts Supreme
judicial Court has made it clear that the tenement landlord no longer enjoys a
favored position with regard to tort immunity. Massachusetts law now offers
essentially three theories on which the person injured on the leased premises
may proceed against the landlord. The plaintiff may claim a violation under
section 19, a breach of an implied warranty under Crowell or negligence under
Young. In comparing these theories, it is important to note that all three actions
recognize the landlord's implied duty to aid in the maintenance of the demised
premises. Hence, no express repair agreement or attempted repair is necessary
to activate them.'" In this regard these actions greatly expand landlord
18 Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973).
"8 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 736, 402 N.E.2d at 1049.




 Id. at 737, 402 N.E.2d at 1050; Crowell v. McCaffrey, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 568,
579, 386 N.E.2d 1256, 1261-62 (1979).
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ty from common law and foreclose any further need for the common law excep-
tion analysis.'" The landlord failing to fulfill his duty to repair unsafe condi-
tions on the leased premises will automatically incur potential liability for any
resulting injury. 165
Despite their basic similarity, these theories do contain differences. One
important distinction involves the degree of notice required. In order to take
advantage of section 19, the landlord must receive proper notice as set out in
the statute. This requires that the tenant notify his landlord of the defect in a
reasonable time via registered or certified mail, or through the proper code en-
forcement agency. 166 Similarly the implied warranty of habitability theory
developed in Crowell, which is grounded in the housing code provisions, would
at least potentially, necessitate compliance with the code notice requirement.' 67
By contrast, under the negligence formula as set out in Young, the only require-
ment placed on notice is that it be reasonable.' 68 Presumably, under Young, if
the landlord knew or should have known of a dangerous condition no notice
would even be required.'"
A second possible distiction between the theories involves the length of
time after notice of a defect that a landlord will have to make repairs before in-
curring potential liability. In the Young opinion, the court indicated that
"reasonable time" after notice may differ between the implied warranty and
negligence approaches.' 7° Citing Berman and Sons U. jefferson,' 71 which held that
the right to rent abatement after a breach of implied warranty begins right after
notice, the Young court seemed to infer that under the implied warranty theory
landlord liability might also begin right after notice.'" This interpretation
would markedly depart from the negligence theory as well as section 19 in
which landlord liability would begin some reasonable time after notice. "3
A final possible distinction between the warranty and negligence theories
is that in its narrowest application, the Crowd! warranty theory also requires
364 Young v. Garwacki, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 729, 736 n.6, 402 N.E.2d 1045, 1049 n.6.
(1980).
166 Id, at 738, 402 N.E.2d at 1250-51 (comparing result in decision with liability under
relevant housing statutes).
' 66 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 186, S 19. See note 77 supra.
' 6 ' See text and notes at notes 134.35 supra.
166 Young v. Garwacki, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 729, 737, 402 N.E.2d 1045, 1050 (1980).
169 Id. at 736 n.6, 737, 402 N.E.2d at 1049 n.6, 1050. Because the landlord knew of the
defect, notice was not required in Young. Id. at 737 n.8, 402 N.E.2d at 1050 n.8. The RESTATE.
MENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY 5 17.6, comment c at 233 (1977) supports the supposition that
notice is not required if the landlord is aware or should have known of the defect had he exercised
reasonable care.
' 70 Young v. Garwacki, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 729, 737 n.9, 402 N.E.2d 1045, 1050 n.9
(1980).
17 ' 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2459, 396 N.E.2d 981 (1979).
172
 Young v. Garwacki, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 729, 737 n.9, 402 N.E.2d 1045, 1050 n.9
(1980).
"3
 Id. at 737, 402 N.E.2d at 1050.
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that the defect be a housing code violation."* In contrast, the negligence for-
mula in no way necessitates that the defect be a code violation, although it
seems likely that such a finding would strengthen the plaintiff's case.' 75
Thus to the extent that the Young negligence rule is free from the burden of
housing code notice and violation requirements, it represents an expansion of
landlord liability over both Crowd! and section 19. 176 Because code re-
quirements can be cumbersome and arguably are not known to all tenants, at
times the unsophisticated tenant will fail to give proper notice, thus barring an
otherwise valid claim.'" The ultimate effect of Young in this regard will be to
allow the unusual case, barred under an alternative theory, to proceed to trial
on its merits.'" The injured plaintiff using the negligence theory will still have
to show that the landlord knew or should have known of the danger, that he
had a reasonable amount of time to make repairs, and that the defect was
serious enough to be a foreseeable causal factor in precipitating the accident. 179
In addition, under the negligence theory of Young, the landlord will be able to
raise the defense of contributory negligence.' 80 These issues, however, will
generally be questions for the trier of fact and very rarely should a plaintiff suf-
fer a directed verdict. The well-prepared plaintiff should be ready to argue any
or all of the theories now allowed under Massachusetts law.
Although differences do exist between the various theories now available
'" Crowell v. McCaffrey, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 568, 578-79, 386 N.E.2d 1256, 1261-62
(1979). The court stated:
We now find in the rental of a dwelling unit, with regard to length of term or
presence or absence of furniture, an implied agreement by the landlord that the
rented unit complies with the minimum standard prescribed by building and
sanitary codes and that he will do whatever those codes require for compliance
during the term of the renting.
Id. See text and notes at notes 134-35 supra.
1 " Note also that $ 19 does not require that the defect be a code violation. Rather it
refers only to "unsafe conditions." MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 186, 5 19.
176 See text and notes at notes 63-64, 166.69 supra.
1 " See, e.g., Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 203, 293 N.E.2d
831, 845 (1973) (tenant's failure to give proper notice as required by statute barred summary
process defense).
'" Even when set against the background of recent reform, Carroll Young would not
have had an easy case against the landlord. Because the porch was under the tenant's control, the
rule developed in Lindsey and King, requiring reasonable care of common areas would not apply.
The tenant had been warned that the railing might be dangerous, hence the hidden defects' rule
would be unavailing and there was no repair agreement or attempted repair. Young might have
relied on MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 186, 5 19, but would still have had to meet code notice and
defect requirements. Young's case also arose before the development of the implied warranty
theory in Crowd!, which, given the landlord's knowledge of the defect three months prior to the
accident, probably would have allowed recovery.
19 Young v. Garwacki, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 729, 737, 402 N.E.2d 1045, 1050 (1980).
The heart of the Young test involves a standard negligence analysis balancing risk of harm and
gravity of potential harm against burden of reducing the risk. The tenant can always be held
liable for injuries on the demised premises. Id. at 735 n.5, 402 N.E.2d at 1049 n.5.
180 Id. at 737, 402 N.E.2d at 1050.
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under Massachusetts law, it is important to note that both Young and Crowell
are consistent with modern judicial and legislative trends that have sought to
expand landlord liability and simplify common law. ' 8 ' The common law
outlook, which provided the landlord with a limited tort immunity, was
premised on the assumption that because the lease was a conveyance, transfer-
ring control to the tenant, the landlord had no duty to assist in the maintenance
of the demised premises.'" In the absence of such a duty, it was impossible to
form the basis for a general action in tort.'" Instead, the person injured on the
demised premises had to show the existence of an exeption to collect damages
from the landlord. 184 Failure to prove a hidden defect known to the landlord or
a negligent repair under an express agreement normally would bar the
claim.' 85 Recent judicial decisions, as initiated in Hemingway, and the
legislative housing statutes have established that in the residential lease at least,
the landlord does have a duty to maintain areas leased to the tenant.'" Judicial
rules that hold the landlord negligent in this duty liable for personal injuries
logically follow and •are expressly supported by the legislature in section 19. 187
In this regard, Young and Crowell, both of which provide theories in which to
hold the landlord liable for injuries on the demised premises, are firmly sup-
ported by modern legal theory.'"
Young and Crowell are also consistent with a second trend in Massachusetts
law. The simplification of common law doctrine has been the aim of recent
decisions, such as Mounsey, which partially abolished property law status
classifications, and Lindsey, which allowed for a general negligence action in
common areas of the tenement.'" Young, and to a slightly lesser extent, Crowell
should further this goal. ' 9° Use of the Young negligence formula should, for ex-
ample, greatly simplify the issues of trial. As the court pointed out in Young, it
will no longer be necessary to mold the facts in a case to fit an exception.' 9 ' In-
stead, the overriding question in the negligence action will be whether, given
the facts, the accident was foreseeable and the landlord reasonable.' 92 Alter-
natively, both the section 19 and Crowell implied warranty actions are also
much simpler to use than a common law exception analysis. Nevertheless, both
will sometimes present threshold questions of code compliance, which could
181 See text and notes at notes 66-162 supra.
182 See text and notes at notes 10-24 supra.
183 Id.
184 See text and notes at notes 28-65 supra.
102 See text and notes at notes 38-43, 52-63 supra.
186 See text and notes at notes 66-119 supra.
187 See note 77 supra.
108 See text and notes at notes 66-119 supra.
189 See text and notes at notes 90-119 supra.
190 See text and notes at notes 149, 151-54 supra.
191 Young v. Garwacki, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 729, 736 n.6, 402 N.E.2d 1045, 1049 n.6
(1980).
192 Id. at 737, 402 N.E.2d at 1050.
May 1981]	 LANDLORD LIABILITY	 907
conceivably blur the important underlying issues of reasonableness and
foreseeability.' 93
In summary, Massachusetts law now provides three theories under which
a landlord can be held liable for injuries occurring on the leased premises —
violation of section 19, breach of implied warranty and negligence. Although
all three theories serve to increase landlord liability over common law they do
contain differences. The principal dissimilarities relate to degree of notice,
reasonable time after notice and type of violation. Nevertheless, Crowell, Young
and section 19 are consistent with modern Massachusetts trends which have
sought to increase landlord liability and simplify common law doctrine.
B. Unresolved Problems after Crowell and Young
Despite the far reaching effect of Young, Crowell and section 19, several
questions still remain unanswered. These issues include the degree to which a
landlord not receiving actual notice of a defect will be charged with its
knowledge, and the length of time after notice a landlord will have to make
repairs before becoming potentially liable for resulting injuries. In addition, it
is uncertain whether the negligence theory will apply to non-residential proper-
ty, owner-occupied two- and three-family dwellings, and recovery for tenants.
Finally, it remains to be determined whether increased liability will actually
encourage landlord maintenance. This section will explore these questions.
The first unresolved issue relates to the degree a landlord not receiving ac-
tual notice of a defect will be charged with its knowledge.'" This question will
arise in situations where a landlord may have been able to infer the existence of
a danger through a more careful inspection of the premises either at the outset
or during the term of the tenancy. Under the negligence theory the issue really
comes down to how stringently courts construe the landlords' duty to inspect.
Several older Massachusetts decisions held that it was not enough to create
liability if the landlord only had a general knowledge that an area was run
down. 195 To create liability the landlord had to have knowledge of the specific
nature of the danger.'" Given the court's emphasis in Young on reasonableness
and foreseeability, however, it is now likely that under the negligence theory
the required standard of knowledge will be much lower. Too many potential
fact situations can arise to state definitively one ideal standard, but holding a
landlord to have made all reasonable inferences of danger, where a given area
1 " See text and notes at notes 166-78 supra.
194 This question was left open in Young because the court concluded that the landlord
actually knew of the defective condition. Young v. Garwacki, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 729, 737 n.8,
402 N.E.2d 1045, 1050 n.8 (1980).
95 See, e.g., Stumpf v. Leland, supra note 41 (actual knowledge of specific nature of
danger necessary to create liability under hidden defect exception). See also Marks v. Citron, 243
Mass. 454, 137 N.E. 647, 648 (1923) (rusty beam causing injury to tenant's son not a trap).
196 See Stumpf v. Leland, at note 41, supra.
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looks in need of repair, would not seem unfair.'" As section 19 requires that
the landlord receive actual notice from the tenant or equivalent, this issue
should not arise in actions brought under this statute.'" It is uncertain whether
the question of degree of landlord knowledge will arise in actions brought
under implied warranty. For example, a landlord might be held strictly liable,
regardless of knowledge of a specific danger, for injuries caused by defects pres-
ent prior to or at the outset of the tenancy.'" Similarly, if the implied warranty
theory incorporates section 19 notice requirements, then a landlord will have to
have actual knowledge of a defect, and, hence, degree of landlord knowledge will
not become an issue. 20° Another possibility, however, is that implied warranty
actions will operate free from notice requirements, in which case the
reasonableness standard of the negligence formula should apply."' This latter
formulation would appear preferable as it would allow courts to respond with
maximum flexibility to the facts in a particular case.
A second unresolved issue involves the length of time a landlord will have
to make repairs, once he has received notice of a defect. As has been noted, the
Supreme Judicial Court in Young distinguished between the negligence and im-
plied warranty theories in this regard. 202 While in a negligence action a
landlord is given a reasonable time after notice to make repairs, under an im-
plied warranty theory, liability might begin immediately following notice. 2°'
This analysis was based upon Berman & Sons v. .jefferson 2" where the court held
that a right to rent abatement begins immediately after notice."' The analogy
1" In reference to undisclosed dangers known to the landlord the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF PROPERTY S 17.1, comment b at 161 (1977) suggests that the landlord need not have ac-
tual knowledge of the condition. Rather, all that is necessary is that he have information which
would lead a person of reasonable intelligence, or a person of his own superior intelligence, to in-
fer a danger.
198 See text and notes at notes 77-80 supra.
199 See note 206 infra. It would appear that the implied warranty exception for the short-
term furnished dwelling was premised in strict liability. The court in Adam supra note 44, for
example, found no basis to establish negligence under the hidden defects exception as there was
no evidence that the landlord knew of the defects. Id. at 539, 70 N.E.2d at 420. Nevertheless, the
landlord was held liable for the injuries sustained from a pre-existing defect. Id. Inasmuch as the
implied warranty has been extended to all residential leases, arguably Crowell may encompass
strict liability for defects existing at the outset of the lease.
200 The court in Crowell did not deal with the issue of what type of notice a landlord must
have under the implied warranty theory. The court concluded that the landlord using reasonable
care could have discovered the defect prior to the tenancy. Crowell v. McCaffrey, 1979 Mass.
Adv. Sh. 568, 580, 386 N.E.2d 1256, 1262 (1979). The court went on to note that it would not
decide whether such a finding would be essential for liability. Id.
201
 The court in Crowell cited Hemingway, S 19 and the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY S 17.6 (1977) noting that these sources proscribe a negligence standard. 1979 Mass:
Adv. Sh. 568, 580, 386 N.E.2d 1256, 1262 (1979).
2" Young v. Garwacki, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 729, 737 n.9, 402 N.E.2d 1045, 1050 n.9
(1980). See also text and notes at notes 170-73 supra.
203
204 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2459, 396 N.E.2d 981 (1979). See text and notes at notes
170-73 supra.
203 Id.
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between rent abatement, which creates only a temporary deferral of payment,
and personal injury liability, which causes a permanent and often much lárger
loss of money, is fairly tenuous. For this reason it is recommended that the
court apply the more flexible "reasonable time after notice" standard as used
in Young and section 19 to the implied warranty action." 6
Another issue which was left open in Young is whether the negligence stand-
ard will apply to non-residential rental property. The court in Young noted that
sections 15E and 19 are not limited by their terms to residential property."'
Yet the court also cited Berman, Crowell, and Hemingway as cases limiting
landlord implied warranty to residential leases. 208 Given the fundamental dif-
ferences between residential and commercial rental property, it would seem
reasonable and consistent to similarly limit the' negligence theory. 209
Another issue left open by the court in Young is whether owner occupied
two- and three-family dwellings will be excluded under the negligence
theory. 210 The court noted that section 19 excludes such dwellings from its
coverage. 2 " In Crowell, however, the court cited section 19 and specifically re-
jected extension of the two- and three-family limitation to the implied warranty
action. 212 In light of the underlying theme of Young, which requires landlords to
act reasonably in all circumstances, such dwellings probably should not be
automatically excluded from coverage under the negligence theory.
The court in Young also did not resolve whether tenants injured on the ren-
206 Adopting the Berman notice test would approach a strict liability standard by dis-
counting in many cases the elements of reasonableness and foreseeability. This result would in
turn conflict with the court's reasoning in Young: "The question now must be whether the land-
lord, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have discovered the defect and repaired it within a
reasonable time." Id. at 736 n.6, 402 N.E.2d at 1049 n.6.
A distinction, however, might be made in this regard between defects existing at the outset
of the lease and defects arising during the lease. Injuries arising in the former situation could be
subject to a strict liability standard under the implied warranty of habitability theory. This would
be based on the landlord's duty to deliver the premises in a habitable condition and would not in-
terfere with reasonable notice standards. See Love, Landlord's Liability for Defective Premises: Caveat
Lessee, Negligence or Strict Liability? 1975 WIS. L. REV. 19 (1975), where it is stated that the notice
requirement makes sense for defects arising during the lease because of the landlord's inability to
inspect. Id. at 104-05. The author suggests, however, that the notice requirements for defects ex-
isting at the outset of the tenancy is a product of the motion of a lease or a conveyance and hence
makes little sense in relation to a contractual approach as provided by an implied warranty of
habitability theory. Id.
This may indeed be where the Supreme Judicial Court is headed. See note 197 supra. It
might be added that if the court does abolish the reasonableness standard in the implied warranty
action for defects existing at the outset of the lease, then in this sense the implied warranty theory
would be broader than the negligence action.
207 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 729, 738-39 n.12, 402 N.E.2d 1045, 1051 n.12 (1980).
208 Id.
1 °9 See, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY 5.1, Caveat, note b, (1977), which
does not extend to commercial property the rule requiring delivery of rental property in suitable
condition. The Restatement, however, notes that this does not indicate that it would disfavor
such an extension.
"° 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 729, 738-39 n.12 (1980). 402 N.E.2d 1045, 1051 n.12 (1980).
211 Id.
732 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 568, 580, 386 N.E.2d 1256, 1262 (1979).
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tal premises could recover under the negligence theory. The Young decision in
the narrowest reading applies only to tenant's guests.'" Undoubtably,
however, Young will eventually be extended to allow recovery by tenants as
well. This would be consistent with King, Crowell and section 19, all of which
allow recovery by a tenant.'" A tenant's possible superior knowledge of the
conditions of the rental premises should not automatically bar his recovery.
Rather this should become one factor, possibly bearing on contributory
negligence, to be decided by the trier of fact.'"
A final point of speculation will be the effect of increased liability on
landlord maintenance. At common law, the landlord actually might be
discouraged at times from making repairs for fear of increased liability. 216 In
one sense the negligence and implied warranty theories might be seen as revers-
ing this trend. The landlord with knowledge of a defect must take reasonable
steps in a reasonable time to effectuate repairs or run the risk of a personal in-
jury suit.'" Yet, the increased liability also may discourageJandlords from
making the initial investigation. A landlord may be less motivated to seek in-
formation on the condition of the premises because mere knowledge of the
defect will incur potential liability. Hence, in the final analysis, Young and
Crowell may encourage prompt repair of known defects but discourage actual
surveillance in order to discover defects.
CONCLUSION
The growth of landlord liability in Massachusetts presents an excellent
study of common law evolution. Such growth is a dynamic process and
represents an interaction of many factors, including changes in cultural condi-
tions and philosophy as well as corresponding shifts in legal doctrine. In rela-
tion to current judicial and legislative trends, increased landlord liability, as
capsulized in the Crowell implied warranty theory and Young negligence ap-
proach, is conceptually sound and consistent. Abolition of landlord immunity
also makes sense in residential leases as a further means of motivating landlord
repair after notification and of assuring that the injured party not be without
compensation for his injury. Future modifications in residential lease doctrine
may provide a new basis for additional alterations in the rules governing
landlord liability. Hopefully, both the court and legislature will continue to
maintain a flexible attitude, willing to alter legal doctrine in order to respond to
new cultural developments as they arise.
JEFFREY H. KARLIN
1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 729, 738-39 n.12, 402 N.E.2d 1045, 1051 n.12 (1980).
" 4 See text and notes at notes 110, 121.37 supra.
"' See King, supra note 110.
216
 See text and notes at notes 57-58, 155-56 supra.
7 ' 7 See text and notes at notes 161-65 supra.
